"Jan Mayen is a desolate volcanic island located about 600 miles west of Norway’s North Cape. It is the home of a meteorological and communications station manned in the harshest of winters by 17 hearty members of the Norwegian Armed Forces. If you read Tom Clancy’s Hunt for Red October, you would know it as “Loran-C,” a NATO tracking and transmissions station. In the video game Tomb Raider: Underworld, Lara Croft visits Jan Mayen in search of Thor’s Hammer, considered the most awesome of weapons in Norse mythology, capable of leveling mountains and performing the most heroic feats.
My brother Mike recently visited this station on Jan Mayen. This is the sign that greeted him.
In norsk, it reads as follows:
“Theory is when you understand everything, but nothing works.”
“Practice is when everything works, but nobody understands why.”
“At this station, theory and practice are united, so nothing works and nobody understands why.”
My wry brother implied that this about summed it up for monetary policy. Drawing on theory and practice, the 17 members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) have been working in the harshest economic environment to harness monetary theory and lessons learned from practice to revive the economy and job creation without forsaking our commitment to maintaining price stability. But the committee’s policy has yet to show evidence of working and nobody seems to quite understand why.
Today, I am going to quickly summarize the action taken by the FOMC at our meeting last week. I am going to explain at greater length why I dissented from the consensus of the committee, incorporating why I believe the monetary accommodation we have thus far implemented has failed to deliver......................
Of course, I am only a single voice at the FOMC table. I presented my views, as did other participants. All views were given a fair hearing. In the end, the decision taken by the FOMC is that of the majority, and the majority supported the initiatives that were announced. We must now hope that they will work.
The Siren Call of Inflation
I might conclude by sharing my concerns about the prospect of temporarily allowing more inflation as a means of unlocking expansion in final demand.
I understand the theoretical basis for entertaining that thesis: If businesses and consumers believe prices will rise, they will rush out to invest and consume now. But the practical aspects of this approach appear to counter the theoretical.
Paul Volcker, who has the scars on his back from his Herculean effort to rein in inflation in the 1980s, wrote of this in the New York Times on Sept. 18.[7] He reminded us that once unleashed, inflation combines with stagnation to make stagflation, the most painful of all combinations for the poor, for workers, for job seekers, for bond and stock holders and for businesses trying to navigate the economy.
His words from that article should be engraved on the foreheads of every central banker: “The siren song [of inflation] is both alluring and predictable. … After all, if 1 or 2 percent inflation is O.K. and has not raised inflationary expectations?as the Fed and most central banks believe?why not 3 or 4 or even more? Let’s try to get business to jump the gun and invest now in the expectation of higher prices later … and maybe wages will follow. … Well, good luck. Some mathematical models spawned in academic seminars might support this scenario. But all of our economic history says it won’t work that way. I thought we learned that lesson in the 1970s. … What we know, or should know, from the past is that once inflation becomes anticipated and ingrained?as it eventually would?then the stimulating effects are lost. Once an independent central bank does not simply tolerate a low level of inflation as consistent with ‘stability,’ but invokes inflation as a policy, it becomes difficult to eliminate.”
To that I say, “Amen.”
Thor’s Hammer
I return to where I began?Jan Mayen Island. Paul Volcker understands better than most the limitations of theory and the harsh lessons of practice. I have nowhere near the wisdom or the experience of Volcker. But as the son of a Norwegian mother, I do know a little about Norse mythology. The legend holds that with his hammer in hand, Thor “would be able to strike as firmly as he wanted … and the hammer would never fail … and never fly so far from his hand that it could not find its way back.”[8] Monetary policy is not Thor’s hammer. It is an awesome weapon. But it has limitations. We must carefully harbor its power. If we deploy it incorrectly, we might level more than interest rates and destroy that which we seek to create. And if we let it fly too far from our grasp, we may never get it back. In conducting policy going forward, we must constantly bear this in mind.
About the Author
Richard W. Fisher is president and CEO of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas."
http://webcache.googleusercontent.c...ed.org/news/speeches/fisher/2011/fs110927.cfm
It is a crime and a shame that only one (Richard W. Fisher) out of 17 Federal Reserve Board members has the intellect to see the problem clearly. His observations like Eccles fit our present day problems perfectly. No two economic depressions are the same and Bernanke while rescuing the top 1 pct has doomed the 51 percent to a 'Stagflation" that Paul Volcker identifies perfectly. One can argue that actual deflation is worse,but death by one thousand cuts ,still ends in death.